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REVISIONISME EN NEGATIONISME
Let us into 
the house of the dead
A soothsayer was brought from his dwelling far off in the hills. 
When he arrived, the venerable man, a great initiate into the 
secrets of time, greeted the rain, turned to the wind and began 
to listen to the angered spirit. He heard the story of his murder, 
the humiliations and torture which he had undergone before he 
was beheaded.
When the spirit fell silent, the diviner offered many words of appea-
sement. Then he added: “Even as I weep, I know that my pain can 
never reach even the outer limit of your suffering, you who have 
been mown down by cruelty. I come to humbly ask you and all the 
dead to receive me into the house of slice and mourning, in this 
dark night where memories open up like wounds.”
(Tadjo 2002, 43)
THE NOISE OF DEATH AND INJUSTICE
A genocide is a noise from afar that swells, a din that renders the killers and those who will soon be dead crazy: a rumble of hatred, jealousy, and contempt, amplified over decades by a cruel North wind ; the whistling of the plane’s jet engines as it approaches the Kigali airport, 6 April 1994 at 8:00pm, carrying the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents; the 
launch of two surface-to-air missiles, the impact on the cabin, the plane crashing, the 
firefighters’ sirens spinning in circles, and the shouts of men who do not know what 
to shout. Then, there’s the howling of the Radio-télévision Mille Collines (RTLM), 
trained weeks ago: it says to “work”; orders listeners to kill; demands that the inyenzi, 
those Tutsi cockroaches, be crushed. And barriers are erected everywhere. They bark 
only, show me your ID card, what’s the ethnicity listed there, you have the nose of a 
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cockroach. The machine runs until it overheats. The dogs bark against those who have 
attempted to take refuge in the swamps, whose remains they will perhaps eat. Then 
the pleas, the cries of men, women, children, and the elderly; the thud of a machete 
that splits a skull, tears flesh, cuts into a bone – but if you pay for my gun’s bullet, 
you’ll die more quickly and with less pain and I won’t rape your daughter before 
your eyes. More than one hundred days of noise, during which the UN, Belgium, 
and France choose the silence of cowards, the bureaucratese of chancelleries, or the 
venomous discourse of traitors, already contributing to the denial of the genocide 
in the vain search for a justification for this scandalous inertia.
Then the crying that we can still hear today; anguish that grips even those who 
weren’t yet born then; tears that run towards the long, long, long path that leads to the 
silence of the dead, the silence of absence. Progressively too, one must hope, there’s 
the silence of contemplation, the life that returns without our 
hearing it because the rising lifeblood and the un-spilt blood 
that lives in the small child’s new body make no noise. Per-
haps, one day, who knows, there will be the silence of peace. 
But no one is required to forgive, and it is not possible to 
silence the howling that remains in the soul if forgiveness is 
not asked for, and it so rarely is. 
No one can say that it isn’t true: the actors, the victims, the 
witnesses, the journalists, the politicians and the tribunals 
know that it happened.
It was not until 7 April 2000, during an official trip to 
Kigali, that Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgian Prime Minister at 
the time, offered Belgium’s apologies and asked forgiveness 
in the name of “his people” for their responsibility, according 
to him, in the genocide. A few hours earlier, in a ceremony 
that took place on the site where ten Belgian Paracomman-
dos had been massacred on 24 April 1994, Guy Verhofstadt 
acknowledged that the government at the time had failed in 
its fundamental mission: to protect those it in its charge. Guy 
Verhofstadt’s initiative asks the ethical and political question of whether he had the 
authority to ask for forgiveness in the name of the Belgian people, who themselves 
do not bear any responsibility for the events.
France’s role was problematic as well. As the organizer of Opération Turquoise, 
authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994, it has been 
accused of having covered up the escape of perpetrators of the genocide into Zaire 
[now the Democratic Republic of Congo] (Brana & Cazeneuve 1998). In April 2014, 
during the 20th anniversary commemoration of the genocide, president Kagame 
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accused the French army of direct participation in this affair. The question recently 
resurfaced following the April 2015 declassification of the Élysée archives pertaining 
to the French intervention in Rwanda.
THE STAMMERINGS OF THE LOGOS
Men live in language. Words must be put over all this noise, perhaps first of all 
because speaking heals – just ask the psychologists and psychoanalysts. Because 
even those who were not mixed up in these events have been wounded by them in 
one way or another. But also because our human condition – its beauties and its 
abjection – is alive with words. Old Aristotle taught that logos is what distinguishes 
man from all other living beings, this ability to say what is right and what is not and 
to agree on this subject (Aristotle s.d., 10-12). This is what the expression “crimes 
against humanity” tried to do in 1945, however awkwardly, but some things are not 
easy to say. The classification of “crimes against humanity” appears for the first time 
in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter. Jackson, the American prosecutor 
who was the main drafter of the Charter, explained that the expression had been 
suggested to him by an “eminent professor of international law”, identified as Sir 
Hersch Leuterprach. In international law, the definition of crimes against humanity 
has always been particularly unstable, unlike the definition of genocide, and is proof 
of the semantic and legal difficulties it continues to prompt. A few years later, we 
stammered “genocide”, at Raphaël Lemkin’s instigation (Lemkin 1934). The word 
was not an attempt to give a reason for what happened in the camps or on the plains 
of the USSR, because if genocide is explainable, even rational, it is never reasonable. 
There can be no reason to decide to annihilate those who did nothing, to definitively 
reproach some for (simply) living – which is to say, to reproach them for nothing – 
and at the same time, to claim to punish those whose innocence is absolute. To say 
“genocide” is to designate, to affirm, “this existed while no one could have imagined 
it”. For the legal experts – and it is for them first of all that the term was invented – 
genocide is a description. To describe is to put a word on actions; it is clothing made 
of words that can be suitably altered to what was committed and that allows one to 
judge, to say that it was not right, and even that the injustice is immeasurable. It is 
a way to break the silence, not the silence of the dead, not that of reverence, but the 
silence of cowards that follows the howling. 
THE MADDENING NOISE 
There is a way to betray the silence of absence and reverence, of impeding life 
from returning, that consists in maintaining an intolerable, maddening noise before, 
during and after the genocide and the crimes. It no longer made of roaring, barking 
and cries: it is throbbing, insidious; it is a dentist’s drill that never ceases boring into 
your head; the noise of a metal saw filing your head and your heart, a continued 
screech of nails on a chalkboard when you’re trying to rest to no avail. Its name is 
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denial. It has all the audacity but especially all the cruelty. It consists in laughing 
at suffering all the while upholding that it doesn’t exist, saying that what happened 
did not happen, making the victim doubt his reason, his logos. It is to claim that 
you’re not human and that you describe the wrong all wrong, that there is no bor-
der between the right and the wrong, and that only the most violent have the right 
to invent this limit. This intolerable noise is as old as the world. In the Edict of 
Nantes, which has been around for a while, Henri IV ordered his subjects that “the 
recollection of everything done by one party or the other […] remain obliterated 
and forgotten”, as if the atrocities committed during the French Wars of Religion, 
including the Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacre, had never happened (Henry IV, 
30 April 1599, art. I and II):
Firstly, let the memory of all things that have taken place on both sides from the beginning 
of the month of March 1585 up to our arrival on the throne, and during the other preceding 
troubles and on their occasion, remain extinguished and dormant as something that has 
not occurred. It will not be admitted or permissible for our state attorneys nor any other 
persons, public or private, at any time or for any reason, to make mention of, or initiate 
trial or pursuit in any court or jurisdiction whatsoever.
We forbid any of our subjects regardless of their state or quality to retain any memory 
thereof, to attack, resent, insult, or provoke one another as a reproach for what has occurred 
for any reason or pretext whatsoever, to dispute, challenge, or quarrel, nor to be outraged 
or offended by any act or word; but to be content to live peacefully together as broth-
ers, friends, and fellow citizens, under penalty, for those who contravene this decree, of 
being punished as violators of the peace and disturbers of the public tranquillity. (Ricoeur 
2004, 454)
Denial does not even wait for the end of the genocide or the crimes against 
humanity, or rather, denial intends for them to never end (see also Coquio 2003). 
The worst is that it is, in this, perfectly logical. Because genocide refuses the simple 
right to exist to certain people, how could heinous crimes be committed against 
them? These crimes cannot exist either! Denial is not an opinion but an aspect of 
genocide itself. The European Court of Human Rights has repeated it again and 
again, including in a recent decision: the degrading position of the victims in the face 
of those who deny their extermination is not a matter of freedom of expression, but 
constitutes a demonstration of hatred as dangerous as a sharp head-on attack.2 If a 
Belgian law cracks down on the denial, minimization, justification or endorsement 
of the genocide committed by the German national-socialist regime during the Sec-
ond World War,3 this is not a matter of restricting historians’ academic freedom but 
impeding the perpetuation of a genocide that endangers those who were targeted. 
It’s also a matter of saving the word of designation, acknowledgement, and justice; 
to not dilute absolute evil in the everyday evils of human coexistence; to cease to 
voluntarily confuse denial and revisionism, the latter intended in the sense of the 
Let us in to the house 
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sincere effort to better tell the history of man. The deniers are always condemna-
ble, unlike the revisionists who do not seek to manipulate the truth. Revisionism 
indeed constitutes a legitimate and necessary approach, intrinsically related to the 
practices of the historian, who must ceaselessly re-examine texts and facts, advance 
new hypotheses and support new theses (see Traverso 2003). The perfidy of denial 
consists precisely in making it pass for what it is not: an effort to think through 
history and write it. 
IMAGELESS EVENTS
To complicate everything there is a “low-grade” denial, almost involuntary, 
that makes the bastards’ premeditated bad-faith denial possible.4 If Western media 
obviously did not incite murder directly, as the RTLM did, they nevertheless some-
times played an ambiguous role. If they contributed to nourishing information 
with factual data, to have people admit that genocide occurred, paradoxically, the 
logic of these same media, and above all the tyranny of the image, led to the mar-
ginalisation of the genocide. Images of the killings in Rwanda from April to July 
1994 are barely more numerous than photos of Auschwitz. In only offering a few 
images of the raw horror, and much more of the exodus of refugees forced to flee 
the advance of the RPF, TV chains created an imbalance in coverage that has left 
deep marks in the memory of the events of 1994. In the eyes of many viewers, the 
victims were those who were fleeing battles and dying of cholera by the hundreds 
(see Fierens 2009). 
A UNIVERSAL MECHANISM, A SINGULAR CONTEXT
In Rwanda itself, from the very beginning, everything was done to hide the real-
ity of what was going to happen or what was being committed, from concealing 
the planned assassination with a civil war born out of self-defence against the RPF 
invaders, who were supposedly perpetrating a genocide. This venom flowed from 
the official Rwandan bodies. The Radio-télévision libre des Mille Collines, close to 
the powers in place, constantly vomited it (see Chrétien 2002). But it also gangrened 
the UN Security Council, where Rwanda was represented by the government perpe-
trating the genocide, as well as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
who received that government’s representatives in Geneva in May 1994. It was an 
official delegation of this interim government that reported to the Organization of 
African Unity, in June, and denied the truth of the genocide. 
Denial, inherent to any genocide, is preoccupied with erasing the evidence. Yet 
historians and legal experts need to uncover the traces of the genocide and obtain 
certainties. These will be sought first of all among the witnesses – that is to say, above 
all, the escaped victims. They are, however, anointed with a paradoxical authority. 
The survivor is there to speak of what they’ve seen, but their discourse is perceived 
(4) Jean-Paul Sartre gave the 
term “bastard” (in French, 
salaud) a moral and philosophical 
signification. It refers to the 
coward, the thoughtless, he 
who flees when faced with 
responsibility. The bastard acts 
as though he can ignore the real 
to avoid becoming involved. See 
Sartre 1983 and 1938.
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to be problematic and insufficient to establish proof of the genocide as such (Coquio 
2003, 34). Does their suffering – past, present, and the suffering to come – make 
them reliable witnesses, however much consideration it deserves?
Furthermore, some of the sociological and anthropological characteristics of 
Rwandan culture favour the development of a denialist discourse (Rosoux 2005). 
Rwandans speak little, and do not often consider what they have to say to be more 
precious than silence. It is rare to speak of one’s pain or wounds. Testimonies result 
from a personal decision and a courageous process; they are not made at the request 
of institutions, journalists, or historians.
WOMEN’S SPEECH AND WOMEN’S SILENCE
Discretion, if not muteness, is particularly expected from women (Vidal 2003). 
If suffering can be neither measured not compared, who will deny that their testi-
monies contain something particular and terrible to say? And to speak it, when the 
wound is still so deep, so far from the hopes of healing? Yet women were the first to 
take the initiative to speak. Among them, Yolande Mukagasana wrote La morte de 
veut pas de moi (Death does not want me, 1997) and N’aie pas peur de savoir (Don’t 
be afraid to know, 1999). Marie-Aimable Umurerwa speaks the horror in Comme la 
langue entre les dents (Like a tongue between the teeth, 2000). Esther Mujawayo 
gives her testimony in SurVivantes (Women Survivors, 2004; Vivantes translates 
to the living in the feminine plural form). As an escaped survivor, she feels trapped 
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between the need to make the truth known and the refusal of some to hear it. “In 
Rwanda, they tell us today: it’s been talked about enough.” In a context in which, she 
explains, no home was spared from grief and in each family there is someone who 
participated in the genocide “we felt that it shouldn’t be talked about” (Mujawayo 
& Belhaddad 2004, 19-20).
And then there’s the fear that invades the bodies and souls once and for all. In 
Rwanda, the killers and the survivors must continue to live together, in close prox-
imity. In a country with a particularly dense population, people have to squeeze into 
the same hills and the same villages, with the same neighbours as before, hoe the 
same fields and get water from the same wells. One hesitates to speak before one’s 
former executioners because they could begin again, or perhaps simply because it 
is not possible to live among them if one speaks of those days of immense noise.
I TRY NOT TO BELIEVE MYSELF
Incredulity is another problem: for the speakers, of course, for the victims fear-
ing they will not be believed if they tell what they’ve experienced, who wonder if 
the unbearable reality they describe could really have existed or if they will wake 
up from the worst nightmare possible. This hesitation is neither historical doubt 
nor denial. Rather, it has something of the will to survive. “It’s something inside 
us, inside me, something confused, crazy,” says Esther Mujawayo. This confusion 
can nevertheless impede the truth from emerging, including before a court. Some 
victims will prefer to abstain from testifying out of fear of being accused of lying 
(Mujawayo & Belhaddad 2004, 89).
The killers do not suffer from others’ incredulity. Jean Hatzfeld conducted sev-
eral interviews, with both the killers and the victims (Hatzfeld 2003). In his meet-
ings with the killers, at moments when he felt the need to bring the discussion to 
a close, to get out of the hideous universe into which the interlocutor had plunged 
him, the interlocutor maintained an unvarying willingness, whatever the subject 
broached or the conversation’s direction. Dialogues with survivors could last five 
minutes or five hours and were often interrupted by tears and sometimes anodyne 
digressions. Occasionally, a survivor would offer different versions of the same event. 
The killers, however, never seemed distressed. If their memory failed them, it was 
a normal degradation of memory due to time, incomparable to the victims’ shocks 
and blockages. Doubtlessly, the authors of the killings have taken an opposite path 
to the one survivors seek. The perpetrators’ own survival, which includes still being 
able to look at themselves in the mirror, depends on the banalization of their acts. 
The survivors’ difficulty in speaking, as well as their fears, are in contrast to the 
killers’ volubility and ease; the latter impose their version of the facts with greater 
facility. To deny the gravity of one’s own actions is to deny the genocide. This time, 
it is a matter of denial.
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TO JUDGE IS TO HEAR AND SPEAK THE TRUTH
Judging, particularly in courts, is a privileged means of preventing the denial 
of reality. The justice of men does not only repay the suffering imposed by another 
imposed suffering—which will always seem derisory in relation to the crimes 
committed—nor does it only attempt to protect and reassure (if possible) those 
who remain by locking up the culprits, nor only compensate pain and hardship 
through the payment of indemnities, but how the language of the law, like the word 
“compensation”, can sometimes be cruel as well. To judge is a language act that 
depends on evidence that will be sought mainly in language, in the testimonies 
of the victims. The successful production of evidence will be the garnering of a 
statement of truth, and at the end of a battle of words between the Prosecution 
and the Defence, the perpetrators and the victims, the tribunal will declare, “there 
was a genocide”, and the historical truth will become a legal truth, a res judicata – a 
fixed truth, to be sure, immutably in law, but with the advantage that denying it 
cannot call it into question. 
The quarrel between historians and legal experts results largely from a misun-
derstanding. The historian is right to ceaselessly question how the past is told and 
what it means; this is, in any case, what we ask of historians. The legalists, and the 
Let us in to the house 
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judge especially through his performative speech that condemns or acquits, are 
there to assign each person their rightful place: you, you are guilty (or not); you, 
you are a victim (or not). It is striking to note that in every situation and all over 
the world, this is the fundamental demand of those who have suffered when faced 
with their persecutors. “We know very well that the justice of men will never undo 
what was done, and that it will never give us back those who were taken from us. 
But tell them that they are the culprits, and that we and our dead are the victims.” 
This assignment of each to their rightful place must endure to be effective.5 That is 
what gives the res judicata its authority. 
But speaking the truth, which is the opposite of denial, must be possible before 
a tribunal. Doubtlessly, no genocide so much as that of the Tutsis in Rwanda will 
have destroyed the social fabric to such a great extent. For the first time, state power 
was able to mobilize the majority of the civilian population against a minority made 
up of neighbours, friends, and parents. The former tortured, raped, and killed, and 
were comforted, reassured, and permitted to do so by the leaders’ speech, which is 
to say by the Rwandan legal system itself. In this country, the word of the mayor, the 
prefect, the minister, and the president were the law, much more than what is pub-
lished in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda. The new Rwandan authorities 
especially, and the international community subsidiarily, were confronted at the 
end of 1994 with an unimaginably large challenge: to judge the worst of all crimes, 
committed by tens of thousands of people, most of whom were again living next to 
their victims or next to mass graves they had abandoned after their “work”. And 
this in a country where only the force of weapons had put an end to the madness 
and where the war had destroyed the human and material means of justice. Already 
before April 1994, the legal system was inadequate. What then was the judicial system 
after the massacres? The prisons, the jails, the impromptu penitentiaries such as 
containers in the ground, were filling up with hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands 
of detainees, some of whom were certainly guilty and some of whom were certainly 
not. They had to be judged. 
Rwandan law itself was totally ill adapted. As in many other countries, the 9 
December 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, though ratified by Rwanda, had not led to an adaptation of internal laws, 
with the result that there was no specific penalty for the denial of a genocide or 
crimes against humanity. It is in this context that a first law was enacted on 30 August 
1996, to bring the perpetrators to trial in “specialized chambers”. But the initiative 
was doomed to failure. It was then decided to set up tribunals that were supposed 
to draw from Rwandan culture by adapting to the specificities of the dispute cre-
ated by the genocide. This was the creation of the gacaca courts, a “participative” 
justice supposedly inspired by traditional “on the grass” justice – gacaca literally 
means “grass” – by a 26 January 2001 and a 22 June 2001 law, themselves replaced 
by a 10 June 2004 law. The traditional gacaca consisted in gathering the heads of 
(5) See Fierens 2014, 320-321. 
On the role of criminal trials 
in genocides, see Osiel 2006. 
For a technical approach to 
international and domestic 
mechanisms currently in place, 
see Bosly & Vandermeersch 2010.
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families between which there was a dispute to draw out a compromise solution. 
The reinvented gacacas had nothing in common with the traditional ones except 
that disputes were resolved by non-professional “judges”. The insertion into a writ-
ten law of (retroactive?) offences and proceedings prevents these courts from still 
being considered a traditional form of justice. One of the major characteristics of 
the operation of these courts was, according to the bill’s preamble, that the legisla-
tor considered that “these infractions were committed publicly, before the eyes of 
the population, and thus the population must relate the facts, reveal the truth, and 
participate in the prosecution and judgment of the presumed culprits; that the duty 
to testify is a moral obligation for all patriots Rwandans, and no one has the right to 
evade it for any reason”. Nevertheless, neither the accused nor the victim had the 
right to be defended, assisted, or represented by a lawyer or anyone else, which, for 
that matter, rendered the gacacas non-compliant with the international standards 
of fair trial. Beyond the fact that the right to be defended by someone whose func-
tion is distinct from that of the accuser, the witness, or the judge is one of the most 
universally recognized rights, that victims could not be assisted either is beyond 
unsettling. One can imagine the difficulties that might arise from the obligation 
to speak in person for victims of sex crimes. Yet to succeed in publicly “revealing 
the truth” would have been a solid bulwark against denials of the genocide. Now 
that the gacacas have, according to the authorities, completed their work, one can 
doubt that this bulwark has been built. There exists as many as one million gacaca 
decisions, which have been neither studied nor commented and which are probably 
not accessible. If one day they are, doubtlessly they will reveal the indigence of their 
contents, as much in terms of the establishment of facts as in the reasons for the 
decisions. In any case, it does not seem as though this giant enterprise has blocked 
denials past, present, and future. On the contrary, the criticisms often made of the 
gacacas and their proceedings risk reinforcing denials of the genocide in casting 
suspicion on the reliability of the testimonies thus gathered (see Fierens 2005; 
Fierens & Kanyamanza 2013).
International justice achieved better results in this respect, although in the com-
mon law logic that guided the creators of the ad hoc tribunals, the victims did not 
have, as such, a place in the proceedings and were not able to exercise their rights.6 
Numerically speaking, one could be disappointed: the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda has only rendered 55 first-instance judgements in 20 years, con-
cerning 75 defendants, and has referred 10 others to national courts. Nevertheless, 
on 4 September 1998, Jean Kambanda was not only the first head of government to 
be accused and convicted of the crime of genocide, but he was also the first person 
to be accused and convicted on this count since it was made criminal by law. Other 
judgments reaffirmed that genocide did indeed occur in Rwanda. International 
legal truth is committed to this affirmation, and that is not nothing. The deniers will 
have to find arguments to refute the reasons – which this time, are adequate – for 
these judgements. 
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DANGEROUS CALLS FOR RECONCILIATION
The gacaca laws were also explicitly justified by the will to “achieve reconciliation 
and justice in Rwanda”, as their preambles state again and again. It is unsurprising 
that in some religious environments, this “reconciliation” was presented as a neces-
sity. Some even alluded to a duty to forgive. Reconciliation is the arrangement of 
the necessary conditions for a community life. Forgiveness is another matter, which 
consists, according to Paul Ricoeur’s beautiful expression, in “breaking the debt” 
(briser la dette, Ricoeur 1995; Fierens 1999; Abel 1991). To consider that there’s a 
duty for reconciliation is absurd. To imagine a duty to forgive is revolting.
According to the disciples of reconciliation at all costs, one must “turn the 
page” to be able to live together again. Yet reconciliation is not justice – here, in 
the ethical and non-institutional sense – and without justice, without analysis, 
the history and reality of the genocide risk being endlessly called into question. 
The danger is of refusing to tell the facts, again and again; of refusing to say who is 
responsible and who is a victim in order to refrain from vengeance. Denial is not 
_ Murambi Genocide 
Memorial. Children’s shoe, 
a trace left by one of the 
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always brutal; it can be soothing. Under the pretext of good intentions it wants 
to prompt the pure and simple erasure of the past and the dissolution of the cat-
egories of killers and victims. 
A duty to forgive would be the opposite of forgiveness. It would be a contradic-
tion in terms. Forgiveness is never owed, the word itself affirms it: it is a gift. Even 
if forgiveness is asked for – a minimum condition – no one is obligated to grant it. 
According to the ancient maxim, rights, duties, and the law in general consist in 
“giving each man his due”. What is not owed can never be turned into a right or 
a duty. Above all, false forgiveness is saying, “forget about it”; to break the debt, 
one must first remember that it exists. If forgiveness transpires, it first consists in 
remembering what has really happened and certainly not in attempting to erase 
it. If one day, for some, forgiveness comes, presumably it would be the opposite of 
denial, which consists in doing everything to block those who have the right to enter 
the house of the dead. ❚
Translation: Bronwyn Haslam
Let us in to the house 
of the dead 
(continuation)
_ Notebook with homework 
found in the church of 
Ntarama in the Bugesera 
area, South-west of Kigali. 
Many thousands of Tutsis 
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